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Chapter Three: 
The Virtue of Civility in the Practice 
of Politics 
This chapter has more than one goal. First, I want to introduce 
readers to the apparatus of practices, institutions and virtues (PIV) that 
helps us understand what virtues are. Second, I want to explore the 
notion of politics a little, to see what its main problem is. (I will claim, 
perhaps surprisingly, that business management is largely a variation of 
politics.) Third, I want to reintroduce civility and suggest that it is an 
important contributor to solving the political problem (and problems of 
management). 
Throughout this chapter, I will emphasize process. As we shall see, 
process is integrated in more than one way into the whole structure of 
virtues, as we learn what virtues are and as we train ourselves in them. 
Already, in chapter one, I suggested that controversies are processes in 
which we can seek truth. The writing and reading of books constitute 
another process in which we can seek truth. I hope that the things I 
write here will contribute to a wider discussion of the virtue of civility, 
a discussion which may promote truth, even if the particular ideas I 
espouse here turn out to be wrong. 
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Practices, Institutions and Virtues 
1. Practices. Most of what I want to say in this section is based on 
chapter 14, "The Nature of the Virtues," in Alasdair Macintyre's book, 
After Virtue. Part of what Macintyre has to say in his book is that 
virtues can only be understood in a socially constructed context. 
Virtues make sense against a background of "practices." 
By a "practice" I am going to mean any coherent and complex 
form of socially established cooperative human activity through which 
goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying 
to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and 
partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human 
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and 
goods involved, are systematically extended. 1 
Note, first, that by this definition practices are complex and 
cooperative forms of human activity. Macintyre says that throwing a 
football with skill is not a practice, but playing football is. Planting 
turnips is not a practice; farming is. Tic-tac-toe is not a practice, but 
physics, chemistry, biology, history, painting and music all are. 2 • 
Note also that according to the definition a practice a1ms at 
achieving "goods internal to that form of activity." An internal good is 
one that is made possible only by the particular practice that produces it 
or some other very similar practice. An external good may be gained 
by success in a practice, but it may also be gained in ot~er wa~s. 
Macintyre illustrates the difference with a story of a bnght child 
learning to play chess. At first, the child doesn't really want to learn 
chess, so an adult promises a reward of a bit of candy if the child plays, 
and a bit more if the child wins. (The adult promises to play at a level 
where the child can win, but only if she plays as well as she can.) The 
candy motivates the child to play and to learn to play better. The candy 
is an external good; it is not an intrinsic part of chess, and as long as the 
candy alone motivates the child, the child has no reason not to win by 
cheating. But the adult hopes that the child will come to have other 
reasons for playing chess. She will discover goods that only chess 
makes possible: a particular kind of analytic skill, strategic imagination, 
competitive intensity, etc. She will come to value chess for its internal 
goods and she will come to see that cheating, though it may gain her 
' 3 
external goods, destroys the internal goods of chess. 
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Notice, in this example, that we say the child "comes to" value 
chess, that she "comes to" see that cheating ruins chess. These insights 
don't happen all at once, no more than skill in chess is gained all at 
once. The beginner gains both skill and insight by a process of training 
in a practice. 
- · The internal goods of a practice can only be gained through that 
practice (or another practice of the same type), and to a large degree 
( they are only recognizable by people who have gained a measure of 
\ competence in the practice. Non~chess players may not recogni~e the 
internal goods of chess that motivate chess players. People w1thout 
relevant experience cannot judge the internal goods of a practice. 
2. Institutions. Macintyre warns us not to confuse practices with 
institutions. Institutions are human organizations that grow up around 
a practice and make it possible. Playing chess is a practice; chess 
clubs, companies which publish chess literature or produce chess sets, 
chess clocks and other paraphernalia, and national and international 
chess organizations are all institutions. 
Institutions control external goods related to practices. Typically, 
external goods include money, prestige, and status. But institutions 
cannot control the internal goods of a practice. Chess institutions can 
recognize so-and-so as a master level player; they can award a prize to 
so-and-so as winner of some competition; and they can declare so-and-
so to be city, regional, national or world champion . But chess 
institutions are unable to give anyone the internal goods peculiar to a 
well-played game. 
Because institutions control external goods but not internal goods, 
Macintyre points out that institutions are always susceptible to 
"corruption." An institution becomes corrupt to the extent that it so 
focuses attention on external goods that it fails to enable the relevant 
practice to achieve internal goods. When the participants in a practice 
focus their attention on external goods of money and prestige granted 
by some institution, the practice in which they engage and the goods 
internal to that practice may suffer. Consider an artist who paints, 
sings, dances, or acts to achieve fame or wealth rather than excellence. 
External goods and internal goods may be achieved together, but in 
some cases they are incompatible; the virtues that enable one to gain 
the goods internal to the practice may prevent one from gaining 
external goods.4 (E.g., the honesty of a really good lawyer may 
prevent her from winning certain external rewards, but the internal 
goods of a practice of law cannot be had without that honesty.) 
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Institutions may be short-lived, such as a weekend chess 
tournament; they may endure as organizations far longer than any of 
the human beings involved in them, as with professional or scientific 
associations like the American Medical Association. 
What we call business is not a single practice, though we might 
think of business as a group of practices. Retailing clothing is a 
practice, as is producing beverages, providing nursing care, and 
thousands of other businesses. Each of these practices is a complex, 
cooperative human endeavor that has its own internal standards of 
excellence. Each of them exists to achieve internal goods made 
possible only by the practice. Through the institutions associated with 
these practices we also gain external goods, money in particular. We 
often focus on the external rewards of a job, but if that is all there is to 
a job-if there are no internal goods achieved by anyone 
involved-then the activity ceases to be a practice. And it's probably 
dehumanizing. 
3. Virtues. With a description of practices and institutions in place, 
Macinyre can give an initial definition of virtues. 
A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession of which tends to 
enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the 
lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods. 5 
Note, here, that virtues are acquired characteristics. Macintyre's 
definition rules out things such as natural physical strength or beauty. 
However much these things are prized, they are not moral virtues. 
Acquiring a quality requires a process of learning or training. 
Beginners in some practice may not have the virtues necessary for 
success in that practice, and one measure of their increasing success in 
the practice will be their acquisition of the relevant virtues. 
Now, to engage in a practice means to submit to an ongoing human 
activity (that is, unless one were to invent a totally new practice on 
one's own). Beginners don't get to do just anything they like and call it 
architecture or gardening. Beginners have to learn the practice, and this 
involves learning its skills, procedures, and standards of excellence. 
Once the beginner has become competent in the practice, she may 
challenge some of the methods and standards of the practice, but only 
after she has gained a measure of expertise in the practice as she 
inherited it. All practices have histories, and the skills and standards of 
a practice evolve over time. In learning and participating in a practice, 
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the beginner involves herself in a community-through-time defined by 
that practice. 
It is already clear, says Macintyre, that some virtues are needed in 
all practices: justice, courage, and honesty. 6 If the standards of 
excellence in some practice are not applied justly (suppose a teacher 
granted grades on the basis of personal appearance), the internal goods 
of the practice are undermined. (There are internal goods to the 
practice of education, and students need just feedback to improve.) For 
a practice to adapt over time, some of its practitioners have to challenge 
some of its methods and standards, and it takes courage to suggest that 
we think and act in new ways. Without at least a minimal level of 
honesty, people cannot cooperate in a practice at all. 
To be sure, some people engage in practices with little virtue (and 
much vice). By their lack of courage, justice or honesty, they may gain 
many external goods-and external goods are real goods, so we can 
understand why vice is tempting. But such people are, in a sense, free 
riders. They are parasitical on the system. At least some people 
engaged in a practice must exhibit at least some level of courage, 
honesty, and justice, or else the practice will cease to produce the 
internal goods for which it exists. 
Courage, honesty, and justice are not the only virtues, obviously. 
Perhaps every practice needs other "acquired human qualities" to 
achieve its internal goods. Readers are free to imagine the acquired 
characteristics that enable success in the practices with which they are 
familiar. 
One more aspect of the structure of practices, institutions and 
virtues must be mentioned. As Maclnyre defines them, virtues depend 
on practices. But what about evil human practices? Should we say that 
the "acquired human qualities" which helped produce "success" in the 
complex and cooperative human endeavor known as Auschwitz were 
"virtues"? We recognize that Nazi soldiers were brave, but does that 
make their courage right?7 
Macintyre's answer lies in the notion of te/os. A telos of a thing is 
the purpose or goal for which it exists. Every practice has a telos, and 
it is by pursuing that goal that people gain the internal goods of the 
practice. At first, a beginner may not have a good grasp of the purpose 
of a practice; he may participate mainly to gain external goods. After a 
while, as he participates in institutions that maintain the practice and 
gains skills and virtues necessary for success in the practice, the telos 
becomes more clear to him. 
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The notion of telos applies not just to practices, but also to a 
person's whole life. Here Macintyre defends an Aristotelian view of 
things . We must ask: what is the purpose (telos) of a human life? It is 
possible that we could come to the conclusion that some practices are 
incompatible with a good life. 
Remember process here. The competent practitioners of some 
practice may disagree over the precise formulation of the goal of their 
practice. Consider driving. In a class exercise I have sometimes 
suggested that the purpose of driving is "safe and timely arrival." But 
other competent drivers- there are millions of us- say that driving is 
also about having fun. We need not reach final agreement about the 
telos of driving to recognize that some attitudes and behaviors of 
drivers partake of vice (tailgating, inattentiveness, etc.) while others are 
virtues (e.g. patience). Part of what it means to engage in a practice is 
to engage in the debate over the goals and standards of excellence of 
that practice. The practice evolves over time. 
In the same way, Macintyre suggests that a healthy community 
would involve its members in a debate over the details of the good life. 
In fact, part of the good life is the search for the good life, and some 
virtues are virtues because they help us sustain that search.8 A healthy 
community would continue to debate just what the proper human telos 
is, but it could exclude certain things as inimical to the human telos, 
even broadly understood. People who are reasonably competent in the 
practice of political philosophy can agree that running concentration 
camps is not compatible with the good life, even if they are still arguing 
over how to best understand the good life. 
The Problem of Politics 
To begin, recall the definition of "politics" I offered in the last 
chapter; politics is the art or science of making decisions for groups of 
people. Thus defined, politics includes family politics, university 
politics, business politics, church politics, and governmental politics 
from small town meetings to the U.S. Congress or the U.N. General 
Assembly. Whenever a group of people needs to decide what they 
believe or what they will do, the political problem emerges. 
The political problem has to do with conflict. As the joke goes 
(which I have heard told about Quakers and other groups), where two 
or three are gathered, there are three or four opinions. People often do 
not agree about what they believe, or about what to do. So political 
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decisions must be made in the context of conflict, and it is often 
thought, wrongly, that political decisions ought to eliminate conflict. 
The goal of politics can't be the elimination of conflict, because 
some conflict helps produce better decisions for the people involved. 
Many writers on business management have pointed out that in some 
circumstances, lack of conflict causes as much difficulty as too much 
conflict. Decision-making bodies afflicted with "group think" have too 
little conflict. Everyone in the group sees the question before them in 
similar ways, so each one readily agrees to the first policy proposal 
offered, and other, possibly better, solutions are not considered. Wise 
leaders will sometimes deliberately foster conflicting views in the 
decision making body-as when a conservative president includes 
liberals in his cabinet, or vice versa- in order to produce more creative 
thinking, and thus better decisions. 
If the goal of politics isn't the elimination of conflict, what is it? On 
a superficial level, I just identified the goal of politics as "better 
decisions." But what are better decisions? How do we tell good 
political decisions from bad ones? How do we tell good political 
decisions from even better ones? We are asking what the telos of 
politics is. 
I suggest that the telos of politics is shalom. This biblical Hebrew 
word means "peace," but also much more. It involves harmony, 
completeness, integrity, and wholeness. In a community of shalom no 
one starves, because shalom includes physical contentedness. In a 
community of shalom no one despairs, because shalom includes 
psychological health. In a community of shalom no one faces his 
problems alone, because shalom includes solidarity. And so on.9 
Clearly, in using shalom to describe the political telos, I am 
describing a goal toward which we move, not something that any 
society has achieved. Remember what was said earlier about the 
process of understanding the good life. We do not simply turn to our 
pastor or rabbi or professor to tell us what shalom means (though we 
should listen eagerly to what his or her expertise might teach us); all of 
us who competently participate in politics participate also in the debate 
about the goal of politics. Part of the good life is discovering what the 
good life is; part of shalom is discovering what shalom is. We engage 
in the process of discovery as members of an ongoing community, 
inheriting central ideas from previous generations, but reforming those 
ideas in a continual search for truth. 
As we search together to understand shalom and move toward it, I 
think we will find that some conflict is necessary to shalom. A variety 
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of views, vigorously promoted, makes conflict. Out of that conflict 
comes creativity and new options, options that none of the parties to the 
conflict had considered. Sometimes, only creative options will move 
us toward shalom. 
Of course, I hardly need to say that some conflict, or the way we 
handle some conflict, is destructive. Practices of all sorts- gardening, 
commodity trading, clothing manufacture, research in organic 
chemistry, etc.-depend on institutions to sustain them. All those 
institutions provide situations for politics. And all of those institutions 
are susceptible to destructive conflict, usually as people pursue external 
goods. 10 Sometimes the institution itself is destroyed, and sometimes 
the institution continues while the practice involved is reduced to 
producing merely external goods. More importantly, sometimes the 
conflict destroys people. 
One could say that the theoretical problem of moral philosophy in 
regard to politics is distinguishing destructive conflicts from 
constructive conflicts. (One might even go so far as to put it this way: 
distinguishing loving conflict from hateful conflict. But this would 
sidetrack our discussion with complications.11 ) The practical problem 
of politics is to respond to conflict in ways that contribute to shalom 
rather than reduce it. How do we conduct our controversies in ways 
that move us toward truth? 
The institutions that most dominate our lives-our businesses, 
schools, churches, and governments-all exist to sustain practices. In 
all these institutions we must deal with conflict. If we handle conflict 
well, the institutions will better sustain the practices and the internal 
goods at which they aim. So I suggest that the principle problem of 
business management is a political problem, the management of 
conflict. 
The Virtue of Civility in the Practice of Politics 
Remember Macintyre's definition of a virtue: "an acquired human 
quality the possession of which tends to enable us to achieve those 
goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively 
prevents us from achieving any such goods." 
Now I want to suggest that politics, as defined in the previous 
chapter-the art or science of making decisions for groups of 
people-is a practice. 12 We might call it a "second level" practice, 
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since people engage in it in the service of institutions which themselves 
exist to sustain "first level" practices. 
Illustration: a pharmacist engages in the first level practice of 
providing pharmacological services to the public. He gains external 
rewards (income, local recognition) and achieves internal goods (at 
which I can only guess) which pharmacists know. He participates in 
several institutions that sustain the practice of pharmacy: his own store, 
a drug supply cooperative, and a state pharmacists' association. In each 
of these institutions he joins others in making group decisions; he 
participates in the second level practice of politics. Perhaps he 
participates in politics only for external goods (he wants recognition by 
HMOs for his store), but he may also gain goods internal to the 
political process (a sense of empowerment, perhaps, or a feeling that he 
has defended his values by urging the pharmacists' association to 
oppose assisted suicide). 
I suppose there are many virtues (acquired characteristics which 
tend to enable acquisition of internal goods) of politics: courage, 
honesty, justice, creativity, hope, practical judgment, etc. Among these 
virtues is civility. 
Remember from the last chapter the definition of civility I 
suggested. Civility is a properly grounded character trait that moves 
an individual to treat political opponents well and/or to feel certain 
emotions toward political opponents, emotions that move an individual 
to treat political opponents well. A few comments on this definition 
will help make it clearer. 13 First, civility is directed toward one's 
political opponents; I suppose we should be civil to our political allies 
as well, but that's easier. Second, civility moves us to treat our political 
opponents "well"; that is, we shouldn't impugn their motives, lie about 
them, use ad-hominem or other fallacious arguments against them, or 
ignore them; and we should keep our agreements with them, debate 
honestly with them, and respect them. Third, civility is a character 
trait, not merely an action or collection of actions. Civility, as other 
virtues, describes who a person is, not just what she does. Last, note 
that civility is "properly grounded"; this requires explanation. 
Virtues have to do not just with a person's observable actions, but 
also his motivations for those actions. Aristotle illustrated the point by 
imagining different soldiers, all standing in battle line, doing what a 
brave man does, but each exhibiting some kind of pseudo-courage. For 
instance, the ignorant man fought with no understanding that battles 
could be dangerous, the professional soldier fought because he was 
experienced and calculating, and the citizen soldier fought to achieve 
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recognition from his fellow citizens. None of these men, Aristotle said, 
exhibited true courage. In a similar way, I imagine that people could 
treat their political opponents well for the wrong reasons. Perhaps, like 
the ignorant soldier, they don't understand that civility has its dangers . 
Or, like the professional soldier, they calculate that treating one's 
opponent well is the best way to achieve their goals . These sorts of 
civility will wilt in certain circumstances-when the cost of civility 
becomes apparent, when treating an opponent well may produce 
political defeat. 
Now, just what the proper ground for civility is is not the subject of 
this chapter. 14 Process again: while still pressing for agreement about 
the basis for civility, we can agree that it describes an important virtue, 
and we can explore the ways it tends toward achieving the internal 
goods of politics. There are at least four advantages which civility 
contributes to the practice of politics. 
First, civility helps prevent destructive conflict. Remember the 
plaintive words of Rodney King, after the acquittal of the police 
officers who beat him and the riot that followed. "People, I just want to 
say, you know, can we all get along? . .. I mean, we're all stuck here 
for a while. Let's try to work it out."15 Riots show us how destructive 
conflict can be; surely we want to avoid that. But political conflict 
with less fury and on a smaller scale (maybe it is "only" verbal, on a 
work team or at town council) can still be destructive of institutions and 
the practices institutions sustain. 
Second, civility helps preserve participants in a political process as 
resources for decision-making. An important turn comes when we stop 
seeing the political opponent as merely an obstacle or a naysayer and 
see the opponent as a resource for better decision-making. My political 
opponent sees the issue differently than I do. He may have information 
or values or concerns that I don't know about. (I may think I already 
know all about his reasons for opposing my position, but I probably 
don't.) If I treat my opponent well, his knowledge, values, and 
concerns remain available as resources for inventing new options. If I 
have the power to do so, and if I cut my opponent out of the decision 
process, I effectively reduce my resources for making a good decision. 
Third, civility helps reduce distortions in communication. Political 
processes, whether the institution is a hospital or computer chip 
company, depend on communication. Nothing fouls up communication 
quite as effectively as enmity. It breeds fear, mistrust, lies, and 
manipulation. But the virtue of civility expresses itself in treating 
opponents well. This feature of civility is so important that people have 
The Virtue of Civility in the Practice of Politics 33 
invented rules of order and etiquette (sometimes formally adopted in 
written form) to preserve it. Rules, though, are not enough; we need 
the actual virtue, the character trait which motivates proper behavior. 
Fourth, civility helps preserve participants in politics as people of 
dignity. Which is more important, defeating Mrs. Brown's silly 
proposal to paint the church nursery walls brown, or treating Mrs. 
Brown herself as a person of worth? A civil person may oppose Mrs. 
Brown's ideas, but he will do so without opposing Mrs. Brown. 
The practice of politics is only one part of a person's life. This last 
advantage of civility looks beyond politics and connects a person's 
character as a political actor with her character in the whole of life. If 
we limit ourselves to the confines of a single practice, politics, the 
political opponent is a priceless resource, so civility is a virtue. In the 
context of one's whole life, the political opponent turns out to be a 
human being, worthy of even more respect, so this fourth advantage of 
civility is most important of all. 
A Caution 
We should be clear-minded about the costs of civility. A candidate 
who treats his opponent well may lose the election . (Attack ads, 
especially when delivered on television late in an election campaign, 
are distressingly successful. Nevertheless, the civil candidate will 
eschew them.) A university that treats other schools fairly may see 
them gain students at its expense. A mid-level manager who treats 
other managers in his firm well may lose rewards and prestige to an 
unscrupulous colleague. 
In short: if you treat your opponent well, he might beat you. He 
might not be interested in better decisions. He might treat politics as a 
win-lose proposition. You can invite him to participate in politics more 
competently- that is, more virtuously- but there are people who have 
not been well trained in politics and who seem to think its telos is 
winning. You may find training such people in the true purpose of 
politics a long, difficult business. 
Nevertheless, I contend that civility is a real virtue. If we cultivate 
it in ourselves, we will more readily reap the internal goods of politics. 
We will make progress toward shalom. 
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